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Interactive Knowledge with Unawareness

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  • Jing Li

    () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This paper extends Li (2008b) to the multi-agent environment, where players reason about each other’s awareness as well as knowledge, subject to their own awareness constraints. I characterize the interactive knowledge hierarchies under unawareness, which significantly differ from those in the standard information partition model by allowing for false interactive knowledge. Aumann’s classic characterization of common knowledge does not immediately apply in this environment, even if there is “common awareness” of the event involved. An alternative characterization of common knowledge is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Jing Li, 2008. "Interactive Knowledge with Unawareness," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:08-023
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    File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/working-papers/08-023.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Unawareness - A Gentle Introduction to both the Literature and the Special Issue," Working Papers 145, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Li, Jing, 2009. "Information structures with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 977-993, May.
    3. Fritz, Morgane M.C. & Maxson, Peter A. & Baumgartner, Rupert J., 2016. "The mercury supply chain, stakeholders and their responsibilities in the quest for mercury-free gold," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 177-192.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    unawareness; state space models; interactive knowledge; common knowledge;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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