IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pen/papers/08-021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Modeling Unawareness in Arbitrary State Spaces

Author

Listed:
  • Jing Li

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

I develop a set-theoretic model of unawareness without making any structural assumptions on the underlying state space. Unawareness is characterized as a measurability constraint that results in players' reasoning about a “coarse" subjective algebra of events. The model is shown to be essentially equivalent to the product model in Li (2007), indicating that such a measurability constraint can be captured by restrictions on the dimensions of the state space without loss of generality. I use a variant of the partition model to examine the case of partial unawareness, where the player is aware of a question but unaware of some possible answers to that question, and characterize the player's knowledge hierarchies from his subjective perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Jing Li, 2008. "Modeling Unawareness in Arbitrary State Spaces," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:08-021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/08-021.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Li, Jing, 2009. "Information structures with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 977-993, May.
    2. Fritz, Morgane M.C. & Maxson, Peter A. & Baumgartner, Rupert J., 2016. "The mercury supply chain, stakeholders and their responsibilities in the quest for mercury-free gold," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 177-192.
    3. Leandro Rêgo & Joseph Halpern, 2012. "Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 131-155, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    unawareness; partial unawareness; information; information partition; the state space;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:08-021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Administrator (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.