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A measure for contestedness of a two-person bargaining problem

Author

Listed:
  • Claus-Jochen Haake

    (Paderborn University)

  • Thomas Streck

    (Paderborn University)

Abstract

Since Nash's (1950) seminal paper on the cooperative bargaining problem, the discipline has concentrated on the design of and solutions for bargaining problems. Nothing was said about how simple or difficult it is to find an agreement. We consider two-person bargaining problems and provide axioms for a mapping that assigns to each bargaining problem a number that quantifies the severeness of the conflict. We term this number the contestedness of a bargaining problem and show that there is one and only one mapping satisfying the axioms. Moreover, the axioms are shown to be logically independent, so that none of them can be dismissed. The contestedness is a normalized version of the standard traveling time introduced by Perles and Maschler (1981) to define a superadditive bargaining solution. Recognizing the payoff set reflects players' preferences our approach can also be utilized to measure similarity of diversity of preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Claus-Jochen Haake & Thomas Streck, 2025. "A measure for contestedness of a two-person bargaining problem," Working Papers Dissertations 144, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pdn:dispap:144
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    File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/dispap/DP144.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Subrato Banerjee, 2020. "Effect of reduced opportunities on bargaining outcomes: an experiment with status asymmetries," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 313-346, October.
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    More about this item

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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