The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination
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- Simon Cowan, 2016.
"Welfare-increasing third-degree price discrimination,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 47(2), pages 326-340, May.
- Simon GB Cowan, 2013. "Welfare-increasing third-degree price discrimination," Economics Series Working Papers 652, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Tomohiro Ara & Arghya Ghosh, 2012. "Bargaining, Tariffs and Vertical Specialization," Discussion Papers 2012-14, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Alexandre de CorniÃ¨re & Romain De Nijs, 2013. "Online Advertising and Privacy," Economics Series Working Papers 650, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Iñaki Aguirre, 2008. "Output and misallocation effects in monopolistic third-degree price discrimination," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-11.
More about this item
KeywordsPrice Discrimination; Monopoly;
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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