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Delegation of Taxation Authority and Multipolicy Commitment in a Decentralized Leadership Model

Author

Listed:
  • Nobuo Akai

    (Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University)

  • Takahiro Watanabe

    (PhD. Student, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

This paper examines to what extent taxation authority should be delegated to local or lower-level government. Delegation of taxation authority can be regarded as a commitment to the local tax rate ex ante in a decentralized leadership model, in which local governments set policies ex ante and the central government decides transfer policies ex post. Previous papers point out that the ex post interregional transfers of the central government distort the ex ante regional policies of local governments. However, Silva (2014, 2015) clarify the case where efficient expenditure by local governments is achieved. This paper examines the delegation of taxation authority by extending Silva's model to include commitment to taxation and generally derives the conditions when efficient public expenditure by local governments can be achieved in relation to the delegation of taxation authority. The model adopted in this paper allows various levels of spillovers of local public goods and various types of multipolicy commitments of taxation and/or expenditure.

Suggested Citation

  • Nobuo Akai & Takahiro Watanabe, 2019. "Delegation of Taxation Authority and Multipolicy Commitment in a Decentralized Leadership Model," OSIPP Discussion Paper 19E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
  • Handle: RePEc:osp:wpaper:19e006
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robin Boadway, 2004. "The Theory and Practice of Equalization," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(1), pages 211-254.
    2. Akai, Nobuo & Sato, Motohiro, 2008. "Too big or too small? A synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 551-559, November.
    3. Arthur Caplan & Emilson Silva, 2011. "Impure public goods, matching grant rates and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(3), pages 322-336, June.
    4. Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino, 2014. "Selective decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-5.
    5. Caplan, Arthur J. & Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 265-284, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multipolicy commitment. Ex post interregional transfers. Spillover effect;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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