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Non-Exclusive Insurance with Free Entry: A Pedagogical Note

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  • Pradeep Dubey
  • John Geanakoplos

Abstract

We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium, in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further secondary insurance at a higher premium. We provide a simple proof of this result (extended to multiple types of consumers) with the hope that it may be pedagogically useful.

Suggested Citation

  • Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2018. "Non-Exclusive Insurance with Free Entry: A Pedagogical Note," Department of Economics Working Papers 18-05, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:18-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2014. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," TSE Working Papers 14-532, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2016.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun & Andrew Kosenko, 2017. "Equilibrium in a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection with Endogenous Information," NBER Working Papers 23556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hellwig, Martin F., 1988. "A note on the specification of interfirm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 154-163, October.
    4. Glosten, Lawrence R, 1994. "Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1127-1161, September.
    5. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2001. "Insurance Contracts Designed by Competitive Pooling," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1315, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    7. Jaynes, Gerald David, 1978. "Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 394-422, December.
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