Industrial Espionage with a Noisy Intelligence
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References listed on IDEAS
- Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & S. Chakrabarti, 2009.
"Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies,"
Departmental Working Papers
2009-11, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Sudipta Sarangi, 2010. "Spying in multi-market oligopolies," Post-Print halshs-00537566, HAL.
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Sudipta Sarangi, 2010. "Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies," Working Papers 2010.117, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
More about this item
KeywordsEspionage; Monopoly; Entry; Asymmetric information; Signaling game.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-09-09 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-09-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2012-09-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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