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Information Independence and Common Knowledge

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Gossner
  • Ehud Kalai
  • Robert Weber

Abstract

Conditions of information independence are important in information economics and game theory. We present notions of partial independence in Bayesian environments, and study their relationships to notions of common knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Gossner & Ehud Kalai & Robert Weber, 2007. "Information Independence and Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers 1453, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1453
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1453.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
    2. Luciano I. de Castro, 2009. "Affiliation and Dependence in Economic Models," Discussion Papers 1479, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian games; independent types; common knowledgees;

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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