Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets
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- Peng, Lin & Röell, Ailsa A, 2009. "Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Won-Yong Oh & Young Kyun Chang & Zheng Cheng, 2016. "When CEO Career Horizon Problems Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Roles of Industry-Level Discretion and Blockholder Ownership," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 133(2), pages 279-291, January.
More about this item
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-04-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-FIN-2006-04-01 (Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2006-04-01 (Financial Markets)
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