Utilitarianism with Prior Heterogeneity
Harsanyi's axiomatic justification of utilitarianism is extended to a framework with subjective and heterogenous priors. Contrary to the existing literature on aggregation of preferences under uncertainty, society is here allowed to formulate probability judgements, not on the actual state of the world as individuals do, but rather on the opinion they each have on the actual state. An extended Pareto condition is then proposed that characterizes the social utility function as a convex combination of individual ones and the social prior as the independent product of individual ones.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marcus Pivato & Philippe Mongin, 2014.
"Ranking Multidimensional Alternatives and Uncertain Prospects,"
THEMA Working Papers
2014-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Mongin, Philippe & Pivato, Marcus, 2015. "Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 146-171.
- Mongin, Philippe & Pivato, Marcus, 2012. "Ranking Multidimensional Alternatives and Uncertain Prospects," MPRA Paper 42515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2009. "The Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 249-284, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14049. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.