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Effort-based career opportunities and working time

Author

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  • Massimiliano BRATTI
  • Stefano STAFFOLANI

Abstract

In this paper we describe the hypothesis of effort-based career opportunities as a situation in which profit maximizing firms create incentives for employees to work longer hours than the bargained ones, by making career prospects dependent on working hours. When effort-based career opportunities are effective, they raise working time and output per worker reducing workers' utility. A first attempt is made to empirically estimate the relationship between hours worked and the expected opportunities of promotion using the British Household Panel Survey data set. Our analysis shows that the perceived probability of promotion increases with working time and that this result is robust to various econometric specifications

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano BRATTI & Stefano STAFFOLANI, 2005. "Effort-based career opportunities and working time," Departmental Working Papers 2005-002, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  • Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2005-002
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; career; personnel management; promotion; welfare; working time;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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