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Alfred D. Chandlers Konzept der learning base und seine Anwendung auf den Unterhaltungselektronikhersteller Loewe

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  • Steiner, Kilian J. L.

Abstract

The aim pursued in this business history study is to assess whether LOEWE - an originally German-Jewish producer of consumer electronics - had the possibility as well as the capacity to build and preserve a learning base throughout the national-socialist period. Learning base is understood here in the sense expounded by the American business historian, Alfred D. Chandler, in his investigation of firms who boast long-term prosperity. After a discussion of this concept, it is applied to LOEWE for the period running from 1923 to 1945. The main thrust of this paper is a focus on the construction of the organisational substructure that supports the learning base in the 1920s. The erosion of the technical knowledge base is then monitored in the field of television research - a domain which will prove central for the firm in the future - as a consequence of the political persecution brought about by the Third Reich.

Suggested Citation

  • Steiner, Kilian J. L., 2003. "Alfred D. Chandlers Konzept der learning base und seine Anwendung auf den Unterhaltungselektronikhersteller Loewe," Discussion Papers in Economics 47, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:47
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    business history; learning base; consumer electronics; national socialism;

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L63 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment
    • N84 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - Europe: 1913-
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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