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The right look: Conservative politicians look better and voters reward it

Author

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  • Berggren, Niclas
  • Jordahl, Henrik
  • Poutvaara, Panu

Abstract

Since good-looking politicians win more votes, a beauty advantage for politicians on the left or on the right is bound to have political consequences. We show that politicians on the right look more beautiful in Europe, the United States and Australia. Our explanation is that beautiful people earn more, which makes them less inclined to support redistribution. Our model of within-party competition predicts that voters use beauty as a cue for conservatism when they do not know much about candidates and that politicians on the right benefit more from beauty in low-information elections. Evidence from real and experimental elections confirms both predictions. (C) 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Suggested Citation

  • Berggren, Niclas & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2017. "The right look: Conservative politicians look better and voters reward it," Munich Reprints in Economics 55048, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:55048
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Besley, 2004. "Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 193-215, 04/05.
    2. Hamermesh, Daniel S. & Abrevaya, Jason, 2013. "Beauty is the promise of happiness?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 351-368.
    3. Markus M. Mobius & Tanya S. Rosenblat, 2006. "Why Beauty Matters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 222-235, March.
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    6. Berggren, Niclas & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2010. "The looks of a winner: Beauty and electoral success," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 8-15, February.
    7. Poutvaara, Panu & Jordahl, Henrik & Berggren, Niclas, 2009. "Faces of politicians: Babyfacedness predicts inferred competence but not electoral success," Munich Reprints in Economics 19800, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Hamermesh, Daniel S & Biddle, Jeff E, 1994. "Beauty and the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1174-1194, December.
    9. Atkinson, Matthew D. & Enos, Ryan D. & Hill, Seth J., 2009. "Candidate Faces and Election Outcomes: Is the Face–Vote Correlation Caused by Candidate Selection?," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 4(3), pages 229-249, October.
    10. Belmi, Peter & Neale, Margaret, 2014. "Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the fairest of them all? Thinking that one is attractive increases the tendency to support inequality," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 133-149.
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    13. Daniel J. Benjamin & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2009. "Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 523-536, August.
    14. Poutvaara, Panu, 2003. "Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 79-98, October.
    15. Fong, Christina, 2001. "Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 225-246, November.
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    1. repec:ces:ifofor:v:18:y:2017:i:01:p:37-43 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:eee:intfin:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:1-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Tukiainen, Janne & Takalo, Tuomas & Hulkkonen, Topi, 2019. "Relative age effects in political selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 50-63.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00499 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Arunachalam Raj & Shah Manisha, 2012. "The Prostitute's Allure: The Return to Beauty in Commercial Sex Work," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, December.
    6. Shastitko, A., 2011. "Errors of I and II Types in Economic Exchanges with Third Party Enforcement," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 10, pages 125-148.
    7. repec:eee:jeborg:v:158:y:2019:i:c:p:1-14 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:eee:poleco:v:58:y:2019:i:c:p:118-137 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Eiji Yamamura & Ryohei Hayashi & Yoshiro Tsutsui & Fumio Ohtake, 2018. "Racers f attractive looks, popularity, and performance: How do speedboat racers react to fans f expectations?," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-28, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    10. repec:ces:ifofor:v:18:y:2017:i:1:p:37-43 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:oup:cesifo:v:63:y:2017:i:3:p:317-332. is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem, 2017. "Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting Against the Party Line?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6503, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. repec:eee:pubeco:v:157:y:2018:i:c:p:95-106 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General

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