Optimal parole decisions
This paper investigates parole decisions when the offender may commit a second crime after having been set free. A convicted person is discharged earlier if the cost of the crime declines or the cost of the imprisonment increases. More dangerous offenders will be dismissed later unless the second penalty has a stronger deterrence effect on them. Other results require an insignificant deterrence effect of the second punishment to overcome their general ambiguity. If this condition holds, the prison term actually served will increase with a more distant time horizon, more severe sentences, and a higher apprehension probability.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in International Review of Law and Economics 2 19(1999): pp. 159-166|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de
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