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Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick BOLTON
  • Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN

Abstract

The paper develops a simple model of optimal corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analysed.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick BOLTON & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1996. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9619, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9619
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ownership structure; corporate control; liquidity; ownership concentration; block pricing; free rider problem;

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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