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Free Riding as Mechanism

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  • SALMON, Pierre

    (LATEC - CNRS UMR 5601- Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

Free-riding is methodologically puzzling. It is at the same time important and often not observed as an actual phenomenon. The paper explores the possibility of treating free riding as an underlying or causal mechanism. As such, free riding is to be treated as part of the real world rather than of the world of models or theories. However, the free riding mechanism is particularly prone to operate not in isolation but together with other mechanisms. This feature has consequences on issues such as empirical content, testability or relevance. These questions are discussed in the light of some recent work in philosophy of science and with special attention given to the development of experimental methods in economics.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • SALMON, Pierre, 1996. "Free Riding as Mechanism," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1996-13, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
  • Handle: RePEc:lat:lateco:1996-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September.
    2. Alison L. Booth, 1985. "The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Model of Trade Union Membership," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 253-261.
    3. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
    4. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    5. McMillan, John, 1979. "The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(149), pages 95-107, June.
    6. Salmon, Pierre, 1994. "Outrageous arguments in economics and public choice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 409-426, October.
    7. Sugden, Robert, 1982. "On the Economics of Philanthropy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(366), pages 341-350, June.
    8. Johansen, Leif, 1977. "The theory of public goods: Misplaced emphasis?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 147-152, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Science économique et sens commun : trois thèses sur leurs relations réciproques," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2003-02, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne, revised Jan 2003.
    2. SALMON, Pierre, 2005. "Qu'est-ce qui représente quoi? Réflexions sur la nature et le rôle des modèles en économie," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2005-07, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
    3. Francesco Guala & Andrea Salanti, 2002. "Model-robustness in ‘old’ and ‘new’ growth theory," Working Papers (-2012) 0201, University of Bergamo, Department of Economics.
    4. Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.

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