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On the Effectiveness of Economic Policy when Competition is Imperfect and Expectations are Rational


  • Hans Jørgen Jacobsen

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Christian Schultz

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)


We study the consequences of imperfect competition in a macro model with only one imperfection; that of labor market competition. Otherwise the model is ‘clean’; agents are optimizers, prices are endogenous, and expectations are rational. We show that, although imperfect competition in itself can explain unemployment (as is well known), it does not in itself give strong support to the use of traditional fiscal policy in fighting unemployment. Fiscal policy will (almost inevitably) have real effects but only through a special effect that may be difficult to control. In many cases fiscal policy cannot create full employment, and it may very well have perverse effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Christian Schultz, 1991. "On the Effectiveness of Economic Policy when Competition is Imperfect and Expectations are Rational," Discussion Papers 91-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9116

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
    3. Schultz Christian, 1994. "A Note on Strongly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 469-473, May.
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    5. Driffill, John & Schultz, Christian, 1995. "Renegotiation in a repeated Cournot duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 143-148, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kaas, Leo & Madden, Paul, 2005. "Imperfectly competitive cycles with Keynesian and Walrasian features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 861-886, May.
    2. repec:ums:papers:2012-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jorgen Jacobsen, Hans, 2000. "Endogenous, imperfectly competitive business cycles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 305-336, February.
    4. Coto-Martinez, Javier, 2006. "Public capital and imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 349-378, January.
    5. Franz, Wolfgang, 1995. "Theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung der Arbeitslosigkeit: Wo stehen wir 1995?," Discussion Papers 27, University of Konstanz, Center for International Labor Economics (CILE).
    6. Skott Peter & Ryoo Soon, 2014. "Public debt in an OLG model with imperfect competition: long-run effects of austerity programs and changes in the growth rate," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-20, January.
    7. Rankin, Neil, 1995. "Money in Hart's model of imperfect competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 557-575, September.

    More about this item


    fiscal theory; stabilization theories and policies;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination


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