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Habakkuk revisited: A history friendly model of "American and British technology in the nineteenth century"

Author

Listed:
  • Roberto Fontana

    (Universita degli Studi di Pavia and CESPRI - Bocconi University, Italy)

  • Marco Guerzoni

    () (GSBC-EIC, Friedrich Schiller Unviersität, Germany)

  • Alessandro Nuvolari

    (ECIS - Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This paper presents a History Friendly Model which addresses the issue of the bifurcation in "technological styles" between US and Britain during the nineteenth century. The model aims at gaining a better understanding of the micro-dynamics that gave rise to different patterns of innovation in the two countries. In particular, we suggest that different demand patterns might be an explanation for the faster diffusion of capital intensive technologies in the US. Simulation results confirm this hypothesis, although only when we jointly control for the role of technological opportunities.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Fontana & Marco Guerzoni & Alessandro Nuvolari, 2008. "Habakkuk revisited: A history friendly model of "American and British technology in the nineteenth century"," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-064, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-064
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Guajardo, Guillermo, 2009. "Between the Workshop and the State: Training Human Capital in Railroad Companies in Mexico and Chile, 1850-1930," MPRA Paper 16135, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation; Demand; History Friendly Model;

    JEL classification:

    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • N0 - Economic History - - General
    • L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing

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