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Being of two minds: an ultimatum experiment investigating affective processes

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Cappellettia

    (CIFREM, University of Trento, Italy)

  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)

  • Matteo Ploner

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)

Abstract

We experimentally investigate how affective processes influence proposers' and responders' behaviour in the Ultimatum Game. Using a dual-system approach, we tax cognitive resources through time pressure and cognitive load to enhance the influence of affective processes on behaviour. We find that proposers offer more under time pressure and this seems to be due to strategic considerations rather than to other-regarding concerns. We also find that responders are more likely to reject under time pressure. Surprisingly, both proposers and responders appear to be unaffected by cognitive load manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Cappellettia & Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner, 2008. "Being of two minds: an ultimatum experiment investigating affective processes," Jena Economics Research Papers 2008-048, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-048
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    File URL: https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2008/wp_2008_048.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eamonn Ferguson & John Maltby & Peter A Bibby & Claire Lawrence, 2014. "Fast to Forgive, Slow to Retaliate: Intuitive Responses in the Ultimatum Game Depend on the Degree of Unfairness," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(5), pages 1-8, May.
    2. Chen, Shu-Heng, 2012. "Varieties of agents in agent-based computational economics: A historical and an interdisciplinary perspective," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25.
    3. Neo, Wei Siong & Yu, Michael & Weber, Roberto A. & Gonzalez, Cleotilde, 2013. "The effects of time delay in reciprocity games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 20-35.
    4. Björn Frank, 2009. "Clean Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200904, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Jonathan Schulz & Urs Fischbacher & Christian Thöni & Verena Utikal, 2011. "Affect and Fairness," TWI Research Paper Series 68, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    6. Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2011. "Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game," MPRA Paper 30856, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Hauge, Karen Evelyn & Brekke, Kjell Arne & Johansson, Lars-Olof & Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Svedsäter, Henrik, 2009. "Are Social Preferences Skin Deep? Dictators under Cognitive Load," Working Papers in Economics 371, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    8. Alison Harris & Aleena Young & Livia Hughson & Danielle Green & Stacey N Doan & Eric Hughson & Catherine L Reed, 2020. "Perceived relative social status and cognitive load influence acceptance of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-18, January.
    9. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Strack, Fritz, 2014. "From dual processes to multiple selves: Implications for economic behavior," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-11.
    10. Grossman, Zachary & van der Weele, Joël & Andrijevik, Ana, 2014. "A Test of Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4tm617f7, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ultimatum Game; dual-system theories; time pressure; cognitive load; Experimental Economics.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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