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The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study

Author

Listed:
  • Matteo Ploner

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • Anthony Ziegelmeyer

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

Abstract

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two units. Before the agent decides how much to transfer voluntarily, the principal decides whether or not to control the agent by imposing a compulsory transfer of 10 units. Like the original study, we observe that control entails hidden costs. Unlike the original study, we do not observe that the hidden costs of control outweigh the beneï¬ ts and we observe that most of the principals decide to control the agent.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Ploner & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2007. "The Hidden Costs of Control: An Unsuccessful Replication Study," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-074, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-074
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. K. Michael Ortmann, 2000. "The proportional value for positive cooperative games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 51(2), pages 235-248, April.
    2. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    3. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-777, May.
    4. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series dp421, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Barry Feldman, 2000. "The Proportional Value of a Cooperative Game," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1140, Econometric Society.
    6. repec:spr:compst:v:51:y:2000:i:2:p:235-248 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Control; Experimental Economics; Incentives; Intrinsic Motivation; Trust.;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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