Non-Atomic Games on Loeb Spaces
In the setting of non-cooperative game theory strategic negligibility of individual agents or diffuseness of information has been modelled as a non-atomic measure space typically the unit interval endowed with Lebesgue measure However recent work has shown that with uncountable action sets as for example the unit interval there do not exist pure-strategy Nash equilibria in such non-atomic games In this brief announcement we show that there is a perfectly satisfactory existence theory for non-atomic games provided this non-atomicity is formulated on the basis of a particular class of measure spaces hyperfinite Loeb spaces We also emphasize other desirable properties of games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces and present a synthetic treatment embracing both large games as well as those with incomplete information
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Apr 1996|
|Date of revision:||Aug 1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.econ.jhu.edu
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jhu:papers:374. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (None)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask None to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.