The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
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- Schnedler, Wendelin, 2002. "The virtue of being underestimated: a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 171-178, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.
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- Wendelin Schnedler, 2011.
"You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income and Effort,"
German Economic Review,
Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 1-10, February.
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2009. "You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income, and Effort," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 09/226, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
More about this item
Keywordsstochastic order relation; statistical discrimination; Adverse selection;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-09-26 (All new papers)
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