Setting Incentives for Collaboration Among Agricultural Scientists: Application of Principal-Agent Theory to Team Work
The USDA is attempting to shift more research funds into competitive grants involving collaboration across disciplines on large projects. This type of research structure raises a host of information and incentive issues. The objective of this paper is to shed new light on principal-agent problems that are likely to arise in this new funding structure.
|Date of creation:||22 Jun 2010|
|Date of revision:|
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