Are Patents Strategic Barriers to Entry?
Patent protection restricts entry rather than preventing it. In case of a process innovation, it forces a potential entrant to suﬃciently diﬀerentiate his production technology. We investigate whether a patentholder threatened by entry can strategically renew her patent. For low demand, the patent renewal is suﬃcient to deter entry, whereas a high demand attracts competitor, even if there is a patent. On the other hand, the renewal decision can signal information to an uninformed entrant whenever the patentholder is informed. This may act as a barrier to entry. Thus, a patent is renewed more frequently in presence of asymmetric information.
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|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2004|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economics and Business, September/October 2004, vol. 56 no. 5, pp. 349-361|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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