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Rent-seeking and reorganisation of administrative units

Author

Listed:
  • Gopakumar Achuthankutty

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

  • Ayushi Choudhary

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

  • Rupyan Pal

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

Abstract

We examine whether rent-seeking incentives shape a central planner's decision to reorganise administrative units. In a two-stage group contest, risk-neutral administrative units compete for shares of a perfectly divisible public fund, with inter-unit and intra-unit contests occurring in Stages 1 and 2, respectively. We identify the conditions under which the planner prefers reorganisation and analyse its impact on aggregate and stage-wise rent accumulation. We show that total rent accumulation depends on the interplay between changes in fractionalisation, population inequality, and the scale effect from changes in the total population of active units following a reorganisation. While a proliferatory reorganisation (i.e., increasing the number of administrative units), when all administrative units remain active, increases the planner's rent accumulation, it can overturn the loss in social welfare under certain conditions. Furthermore, when some units become inactive, then under mild conditions on population changes, this outcome persists if the reorganisation is effectively expansive.

Suggested Citation

  • Gopakumar Achuthankutty & Ayushi Choudhary & Rupyan Pal, 2025. "Rent-seeking and reorganisation of administrative units," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2025-019, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    • Handle: RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2025-019
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    2. Seung Ginny Choi & Virgil Henry Storr, 2019. "A culture of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 101-126, October.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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