Author
Listed:
- Anna Gelpern
(Peterson Institute for International Economics)
- Omar Haddad
(Oxford University)
- Sebastian Horn
(University of Hamburg, Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
- Paulina Kintzinger
(Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
- Bradley C. Parks
(AidData, William & Mary)
- Christoph Trebesch
(Kiel University, Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
Abstract
This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). The authors present a new dataset and detailed case studies of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions in EMDEs between 2000 and 2021. Almost half of China's total PPG loan portfolio in EMDEs is effectively collateralized--amounting to $420 billion in collateralized debt across 57 countries. The authors document that Chinese lenders use techniques adapted from export and project finance to build multi-layered legal safety nets, which help ensure that risky EMDE loans will be repaid. As security, they use liquid, easily accessible assets, such as cash in bank accounts located in China. They rarely take infrastructure project assets as collateral, but often rely for repayment on established commodity revenue streams unrelated to the project. Typically, EMDE governments and state-owned enterprises commit to route foreign currency proceeds from commodity sales through bank accounts controlled by the lender. The cash balances in these accounts can be very large; in low-income, commodity-exporting countries, they average more than 20 percent of annual PPG debt service to all external creditors. The same revenue source can secure multiple successive borrowings over many years. The paper's findings reveal a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries. Revenues routed overseas secure priority repayment for the creditor; they remain out of public sight and largely beyond the borrower's reach until the secured debts are repaid. These findings raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs.
Suggested Citation
Anna Gelpern & Omar Haddad & Sebastian Horn & Paulina Kintzinger & Bradley C. Parks & Christoph Trebesch, 2025.
"How China collateralizes,"
Working Paper Series
WP25-20, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Handle:
RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp25-20
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More about this item
Keywords
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JEL classification:
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
- H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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