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Miscounts, Duverger's Law and Duverger's Hypothesis

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  • Matthias Messner
  • Mattias K. Polborn

Abstract

In real-life elections, vote-counting is often imperfect. We analyze the consequences of such imperfections in plurality and runoff rule voting games. We call a strategy profile a robust equilibrium if it is an equilibrium if the probability of a miscount is positive but small. All robust equilibria of plurality voting games satisfy Duverger's Law: In any robust equilibrium, exactly two candidates receive a positive number of votes. Moreover, robust- ness (only) rules out a victory of the Condorcet loser. All robust equilibria under runoff rule satisfy Duverger's Hypothesis: First round votes vare (almost always) dispersed over more than two alternatives. Robustness has strong implications for equilibrium outcomes under runoff rule: For large parts of the parameter space, the robust equilibrium outcome is unique.

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  • Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2011. "Miscounts, Duverger's Law and Duverger's Hypothesis," Working Papers 380, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:380
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2007. "Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 287-314, January.
    2. repec:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:38-50 is not listed on IDEAS

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