IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hol/holodi/0003.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

What Learning Models Tell Us to Expect in Three-by-Three Bimatrix Games

Author

Abstract

This paper extends several existing learning models to investigate their fixed points (their long run predictions of play). The fixed points of the model are not necessarily at the Nash equilibria of the payoff matrices but are a function of both the Nash equilibria and the parameters of the model. The stability of these fixed points also depends on both the characteristics of the payoff matrix used and the parameters of the models. These new findings indicate that behaviour previously though to be inconsistent with theory may not necessarily be so.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicole Marie Bouchez, 2001. "What Learning Models Tell Us to Expect in Three-by-Three Bimatrix Games," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 00/3, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2001.
  • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/Economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0003.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Learning; Beliefs; Reinforcement.;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claire Blackman). General contact details of provider: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.