Revenues in Discrete Multi-Unit, Common Value Auctions: A Study of Three Sealed-Bid Mechanisms
We propose in this paper a discrete bidding model, both on quantities and in pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. Both the value and the signals are drawn from a known discrete affiliated joint distribution. The relevant task for the paper is to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller's revenue between the three auction formats. We find that, among the three auction formats below with two players, the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, where the discriminatory auction becomes second and the uniform auction last. We also find that, in equilibrium, bidders bid the same amount on both items in the discriminatory auction; a phenomenon we do not notice in either of the other two auction formats. There, different amount of demand reduction is encountered.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||10 Sep 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +46-13-20 40 00
Fax: +46-13-14 14 36
Web page: http://www.vti.se/tekEmail:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:vtiwps:2008_009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mats Berggren)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.