The Distributional Component of the Price of the Tax Avoidance Service
The traditional avoidance literature undeservedly neglects tax base distribution as a factor affecting the avoidance price, and generally assumed to be equal to the avoidance cost. In reality, avoidance providers are usually either high-skilled specialists or insiders. The strong collusion thus, naturally seems to be an assumption of the behavior of avoidance providers. Within such a framework, income distribution, which forms an avoidance demand together with tax codes, plays a very essential roll for the outcome of both avoidance price and quantity. My article models an economy with a monopolistic avoidance provider and imperfect information, and illustrates possible consequences of tax base changes. The paper examines the relationship between inequality and a government's ability to collect tax revenue, and also considers the possible outcome of a tax base broadening. Furthermore, it provides an additional explanation for the secession decision.
|Date of creation:||05 Jul 2001|
|Date of revision:||03 Dec 2001|
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