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Transparency and Competition

  • Nilsson, Arvid

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

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    This paper examines the effects of search costs on prices in a Bertrand duopoly. It is shown that if the search cost is lowered, the expected price goes down in a single play of the stage game. However, if the game is repeated it may be easier to sustain collusion the lower the search cost. In other words increased transparency may facilitate collusion even if the sellers' information is unaffected. A transitory improvement of price transparency unambiguously leads to lower prices. Hence, the model provides theoretical support for the price publication practices of consumers' councils.

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    Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 298.

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    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: 04 Feb 1999
    Date of revision: 29 Nov 1999
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0298
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