Author
Listed:
- Olivier L'Haridon
(GRID - Groupe de Recherche sur le risque, l'Information et la Décision - ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
- Alain Panaponaris
(Epidémiologie et Sciences Sociales Appliquées à l'Innovation Médicale - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale)
- Camelia Protopopescu
(Epidémiologie et Sciences Sociales Appliquées à l'Innovation Médicale - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, ORS PACA - Observatoire régional de la santé Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur [Marseille])
- Bruno Ventelou
(Epidémiologie et Sciences Sociales Appliquées à l'Innovation Médicale - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
Abstract
This article presents an adaptation of the labour supply model applied to the independent medical in which doctor's choice of the length of consultations is examined. A theoretical analysis is performed in an attempt to define the sets of constraints to which self-employed doctors are subject, and they show a marked difference in time-allocation behaviour according to whether medical care is provided under a fixed-fee scheme or under an unregulated-fees scheme, respectively "sector 1" and "sector 2" in France. The objective of this econometric study was to analyse time-allocation choices made by doctors in both sectors in France and to validate the theoretical prediction that doctors under unregulated-fees can make choices about the length of patient consultations independently of their personal leisure choices. According to our empirical results, doctors with unregulated-fees indeed show different behaviours regarding leisure-consumption choices and consultation length. The endogeneity of leisure choice to consultation length –verified in fixed-fee scheme- is no longer apparent under unregulated-fee. Our findings can be seen as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for legitimate unregulated fees in general practice.
Suggested Citation
Olivier L'Haridon & Alain Panaponaris & Camelia Protopopescu & Bruno Ventelou, 2008.
"Length Of Gp Consultation Within Two Payment Schemes,"
Working Papers
halshs-00347449, HAL.
Handle:
RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00347449
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00347449
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2016.
"Competition, prices and quality in the market for physician consultations,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 135-169, March.
- Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2013.
"Competition, Prices and Quality in the Market for Physician Consultations,"
Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series
wp2013n23, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
- Hugh Gravelle & Anthony Scott & Peter Sivey & Jongsay Yong, 2013.
"Competition, prices, and quality in the market for physician consultations,"
Working Papers
089cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
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