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Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information

Author

Listed:
  • Frank Riedel

    (UJ - University of Johannesburg [Johannesbourg, South Africa], Universität Bielefeld = Bielefeld University)

  • Jean-Marc Tallon

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Vassili Vergopoulos

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This paper extends decision theory under imprecise probabilistic information to dynamic settings. We explore the relationship between the given objective probabilistic information, an agent's subjective multiple priors, and updating. Dynamic consistency implies rectangular sets of priors at the subjective level. As the objective probabilistic information need not be consistent with rectangularity at the subjective level, agents might select priors outside the objective probabilistic information while respecting the support of the given set of priors. Under suitable additional axioms, the subjective set of priors belongs to the rectangular hull of the objective probabilistic information.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2018. "Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01886573, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01886573
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.006
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Post-Print halshs-02900497, HAL.
    2. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
    3. Kops, Christopher & Pasichnichenko, Illia, 2023. "Testing negative value of information and ambiguity aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    4. Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.
    5. Ceron, Federica & Vergopoulos, Vassili, 2022. "Objective rationality and recursive multiple priors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    6. Lorenzo Bastianello & Jos'e Heleno Faro & Ana Santos, 2020. "Dynamically Consistent Objective and Subjective Rationality," Papers 2004.12347, arXiv.org.
    7. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02900497, HAL.
    8. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 20008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    9. Giulianella Coletti & Davide Petturiti & Barbara Vantaggi, 2019. "Dutch book rationality conditions for conditional preferences under ambiguity," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 279(1), pages 115-150, August.
    10. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Working Papers halshs-02563318, HAL.
    11. Lorenzo Bastianello & José Heleno Faro & Ana Santos, 2022. "Dynamically consistent objective and subjective rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(2), pages 477-504, September.
    12. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02563318, HAL.
    13. Yi-Hsuan Lin & Fernando Payró Chew, 2024. "Updating Under Imprecise Information," Working Papers 1424, Barcelona School of Economics.

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