Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence
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- Mathieu Lefebvre & Ferdinand M. Vieider, 2010. "Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 1006, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
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- Tetlock, Philip E. & Vieider, Ferdinand M. & Patil, Shefali V. & Grant, Adam M., 2013. "Accountability and ideology: When left looks right and right looks left," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 22-35.
- Pahlke, Julius & Strasser, Sebastian & Vieider, Ferdinand M., 2010. "Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk," Discussion Papers in Economics 12115, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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Keywordsexecutive compensation; stock-options; incentives; accountability; risk taking;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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