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Financial Incentives to Work in France between 1998 and 2014
[Les incitations monétaires au travail en France entre 1998 et 2014]

Author

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  • Michaël Sicsic

    (INSEE - Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas)

Abstract

This study looks at incentives to work in France, measured using effective marginal tax rates (at the intensive margin) and effective participation tax rates (at the extensive margin). These show the proportion of an increase in earned income captured by the tax_benefit system, either because the taxes increase or because the benefits decrease. They are calculated using microsimulation based on the Insee survey Revenus fiscaux et sociaux. Between 1998 and 2014, incentives to work at the intensive margin rose for very low incomes, and then decrease as incomes rise. Incentives at the extensive margin rose in the first third of the distribution. The profile of the marginal rates changed from a U to a tilde shape. Incentives to work are lower for single people than for couples, but there is very little difference in incentive to work between men and women, except at the top of the distribution to the detriment of married women.

Suggested Citation

  • Michaël Sicsic, 2018. "Financial Incentives to Work in France between 1998 and 2014 [Les incitations monétaires au travail en France entre 1998 et 2014]," Post-Print hal-05494509, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05494509
    DOI: 10.24187/ecostat.2018.503d.1955
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://insee.hal.science/hal-05494509v1
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    2. Elass, Kenza, 2024. "Male and female selection effects on gender wage gaps in three countries," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    3. Michaël Sicsic, 2022. "Does labour income react more to income tax or means‐tested benefits reforms?," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(3), pages 291-319, September.
    4. François Legendre, 2019. "The Emergence and Consolidation of Microsimulation Methods in France," Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), issue 510-511-5, pages 201-217.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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