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On the Use of Global Sensitivity Analysis in a Game-Theoretic Approach to an Environmental Management Problem

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  • Christophe Dutang

    (LJK - Laboratoire Jean Kuntzmann - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes, ASAR - Applied Statistics And Reliability - ASAR - LJK - Laboratoire Jean Kuntzmann - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)

  • Clémentine Prieur

    (AIRSEA - Mathematics and computing applied to oceanic and atmospheric flows - Centre Inria de l'Université Grenoble Alpes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - LJK - Laboratoire Jean Kuntzmann - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)

Abstract

Prioritizing environmental sustainability is a key strategy for securing the health and prosperity of modern societies. In this paper, we study an environmental management problem known as the River Basin Pollution game, where multiple economic agents located along a river may contribute to pollution. An administrative authority seeks to enforce common environmental constraints on those competing industrial agents. To answer this problem, the RBP game is a static noncooperative game, which allows to derive a Pigouvian tax scheme for the agents in practice. We propose a global sensitivity analysis of the proposed game across different types of equilibrium. In contrast to traditional comparative statics analysis, Sobol' indices quantify the contribution of input parameters to the variability of resulting equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Dutang & Clémentine Prieur, 2026. "On the Use of Global Sensitivity Analysis in a Game-Theoretic Approach to an Environmental Management Problem," Post-Print hal-05461442, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05461442
    DOI: 10.1007/s10666-025-10098-y
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05461442v1
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