IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03702689.html

Does Restricting Outsiders Always Lower Price and Benefit Insiders?

Author

Listed:
  • Tat-Kei Lai

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Travis Ng

    (CUHK - The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

Policies that restrict outsiders are common. Some justifications include protecting insiders from high price and leaving more of the concerned products to insiders. Sometimes these policies fail to work because outsiders can get around the restrictions. In a model in which a policy of restricting outsiders is anticipated, we find that if the policy works, it only sometimes lowers the price. When the price does decrease, the product quality decreases too. Not every insider would benefit equally; those insiders who likely suffer are identified. While restricting outsiders may or may not reduce insiders' consumer surplus, outsiders and the producer are always worse off. They therefore would find ways to get around the restrictions. Evaluating these policies must (a) take into account the possibility that they might not work at all, (b) check their effects beyond just price if they do work.

Suggested Citation

  • Tat-Kei Lai & Travis Ng, 2022. "Does Restricting Outsiders Always Lower Price and Benefit Insiders?," Post-Print hal-03702689, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03702689
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-020-09797-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tat-kei Lai & Travis Ng, 2023. "Does Competition Increase Advertising?," Working Papers 2023-iFlame-02, IESEG School of Management.
    2. Tat‐kei Lai & Travis Ng, 2023. "Does competition increase advertising?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(6), pages 3233-3248, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • K25 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Real Estate Law
    • K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03702689. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.