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Does Trust Mean Giving and not Risking? Experimental Evidence from the Trust Game

Author

Listed:
  • Alexis Garapin

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Laurent Muller

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Bilel Rahali

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

We aim to investigate whether trust is mainly influenced by pro-social concerns or by risk-related issues. In a within-subjects framework, we elicit subjects' other regarding attitude as well as preference towards risk via respectively the ring test (Griesinger and Livingston [1973]) and the Holt and Laury test [2002]. These measures are then exploited in two different sorts of giving games: (i) a standard trust game, which – by construction – embodies a dimension of risk (i.e. the transfer-back from the receiver to the sender), and (ii) a (triple) dictator game in which the component of risk is removed. The measures of other regarding preferences and risk preferences were also used to explain the gaps of transfer due to strategic anticipation. The results show that giving behavior in trust game is driven by other regarding preferences and not by risk-related considerations. However, we find no significant correlation between the gaps of transfer and both social and risk preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexis Garapin & Laurent Muller & Bilel Rahali, 2015. "Does Trust Mean Giving and not Risking? Experimental Evidence from the Trust Game," Post-Print hal-01226583, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01226583
    DOI: 10.3917/redp.255.0701
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    Cited by:

    1. Chetty, Rinelle & Hofmeyr, Andre & Kincaid, Harold & Monroe, Brian, 2021. "The Trust Game Does Not (Only) Measure Trust: The Risk-Trust Confound Revisited," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Ambec, Stefan & Garapin, Alexis & Muller, Laurent & Rahali, Bilel, 2019. "How institutions shape individual motives for efficiency and equity: Evidence from distribution experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 128-138.
    3. Daniel Montoya Herrera & Marc Willinger, 2025. "Are risk-tolerant individuals more trustful? A representative sample study," Post-Print hal-05234962, HAL.
    4. Dirk Engelmann & Jana Friedrichsen & Roel van Veldhuizen & Pauline Vorjohann & Joachim Winter, 2023. "Decomposing Trust," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 454, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Ambec, Stefan & Garapin, Alexis & Muller, Laurent & Rahali, Bilel, 2016. "Trading off between equity and efficiency in dictator and trust games," TSE Working Papers 16-718, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Sabater-Grande, Gerardo & García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Herranz-Zarzoso, Noemí, 2022. "The effects of personality, risk and other-regarding attitudes on trust and reciprocity," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 96(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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