Comment faut-il distribuer les quotas échangeables de gaz à effet de serre ?
The current revision of the European Union greenhouse gas emission trading system, in place since 2005, should modify the way allowances are distributed. We compare two distribution methods: a lump-sum allocation, based solely on past information, and an allocation proportional to the current output level. We identify the pros and cons of each allocation method and conclude that it is essential to distinguish the sectors sheltered from international competition, like power generation, from the exposed sectors. In the sheltered sectors, the allocation proportional to the current output level entails a much higher cost, and lump-sum allocation is unfair. Hence we favour auctioning, which does not suffer from these drawbacks. However, in exposed sectors, the allocation proportional to the current output level is an option worth considering.
|Date of creation:||07 Nov 2007|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue Française d'Economie, Revue française d'économie, 2007, XXII (2), pp. 129 à 164|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00639723|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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