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Biological versus Foster Children Education : the Old-Age Support Motive as a Catch-up Determinant ? Some Evidence from Indonesia


  • Karine Marazyan

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


This paper aims at explaining differences in education among foster-children and between foster and biological children in developing countries. Foster-children whose biological parents are alive may provide old-age support for both their host and biological parents. Therefore foster-children have lower returns to education than biological children and should receive less human capital investment in household where both types of children live together. However, in households where foster-children are alone, host parents will over-invest in their education to ensure that the expected old-age support will equal a minimum amount to survive. Using data from Indonesia, we provide some evidence supporting our hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Karine Marazyan, 2008. "Biological versus Foster Children Education : the Old-Age Support Motive as a Catch-up Determinant ? Some Evidence from Indonesia," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00293074, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00293074
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dávila, J. & Eeckhout, J., 2008. "Competitive bargaining equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 269-294, March.
    5. Thomson, William, 1999. " Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 139-176.
    6. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-200, September.
    7. Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(01), pages 73-88, March.
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