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A mechanism for eliciting a probability distribution

Author

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  • Xiangyu Qu

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This work extends Karni's direct revelation mechanism for eliciting agents' subjective beliefs over the distribution of a random variable.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiangyu Qu, 2012. "A mechanism for eliciting a probability distribution," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01437544, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01437544
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.097
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edi Karni, 2009. "A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 603-606, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Cavalan, Quentin & de Gardelle, Vincent & Vergnaud, Jean-Christophe, 2023. "No evidence of biased updating in beliefs about absolute performance: A replication and generalization of Grossman and Owens (2012)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 530-548.
    2. Jin Hyuk Choi & Kookyoung Han, 2023. "Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 833-860, September.
    3. Karl Schlag & James Tremewan, 2021. "Simple belief elicitation: An experimental evaluation," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 137-155, April.
    4. Edi Karni, 2020. "A mechanism for the elicitation of second-order belief and subjective information structure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 217-232, February.
    5. Choi, Jin Hyuk & Han, Kookyoung, 2020. "Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    6. Dustan, Andrew & Koutout, Kristine & Leo, Greg, 2022. "Second-order beliefs and gender," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 752-781.
    7. Demuynck, Thomas, 2013. "A mechanism for eliciting the mean and quantiles of a random variable," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 121-123.
    8. Markus Eyting & Patrick Schmidt, 2019. "Belief Elicitation with Multiple Point Predictions," Working Papers 1818, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 16 Nov 2020.
    9. Lazzati, Natalia & Van Essen, Matt, 2014. "A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 396-399.
    10. Eyting, Markus & Schmidt, Patrick, 2021. "Belief elicitation with multiple point predictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elicitation; Probability distribution;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other

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