This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011, 62, 337-351|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00638178|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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