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The economics of free internet access

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  • Haan, M.

    (Groningen University)

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, we argue that the role of the Dutch State has been (a) significant in the spread of management knowledge in the Dutch management community but (b) changed dramatically during the nineteen eighties. After the World War II, the Dutch government played an important role in the development of an institutionalized network to spread management knowledge through the management community. The government stimulated the introduction of new ideas by assisting in the development of different new institutions. In the nineteen eighties, however, the position of the government changed dramatically. Its role as distributor of knowledge disappeared almost completely and was taken over by consulting agencies, commercial publisher, and conference organizers. Besides the decreasing role as distributor, the government also changed its own interest. More and more, government agencies started to use management knowledge themselves and turned into one of the largest users in the Netherlands.

Suggested Citation

  • Haan, M., 2000. "The economics of free internet access," Research Report 00F49, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    • Handle: RePEc:gro:rugsom:00f49
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    File URL: http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/240318013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
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    4. Walter Y. Oi, 1971. "A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(1), pages 77-96.
    5. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fioramanti, Marco, 2005. "Free Internet access: When is it suitable?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 302-316, July.
    2. C. Deligiorgi & A. Vavoulas & Ch. Michalakelis & D. Varoutas & Th. Sphicopoulos, 2007. "On the construction of price index and the definition of factors affecting tariffs of ADSL connections across Europe," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 171-183, October.
    3. Rajeev Goel & Edward Hsieh & Michael Nelson & Rati Ram, 2006. "Demand elasticities for Internet services," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(9), pages 975-980.
    4. Kam Yu & Marc Prud'homme, 2010. "Econometric issues in hedonic price indices: the case of internet service providers," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(15), pages 1973-1994.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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