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Do You Reward and Punish In The Way You Think Others Expect You To?

Author

Listed:
  • Omar Al-Ubaydli

    (Department of Economics and Mercatus Center, George Mason University)

  • Min Sok Lee

    (Citadel Group Foundation, Chicago, IL)

Abstract

This paper addresses three questions: (1) When deciding on whether to reward or punish someone, how does how you think others expect you to behave affect your decision? (2) Does it depend upon whether others expect you to reward them vs. punish them? (3) What is the interpretation of such a causal effect? We investigate these questions using a modification of the lost wallet trust game (Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000)) that permits punishment. Like previous studies, we collect data on what second- movers think that first-movers expect them to do by directly eliciting the second-moversÕ expectations. Unlike previous studies, we ensure exogeneity of these expectations by instrumenting for them. The instrument is the expectations of neutral observers which are disclosed to second-movers prior to the elicitation of second-moversÕ expectations. We find that what you think others expect you to do has a zero causal effect on both reward and punishment decisions. We also find that it is important to instrument for second-order expectations because they are endogenous. We interpret these findings in terms of models of guilt-aversion and intentional reciprocity.

Suggested Citation

  • Omar Al-Ubaydli & Min Sok Lee, 2009. "Do You Reward and Punish In The Way You Think Others Expect You To?," Working Papers 1014, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1014
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Yola Engler & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Lionel Page, 2018. "Guilt averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioral motivations in the trust game," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-14, July.
    3. Yola Engler & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Lionel Page, 2018. "Guilt averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioral motivations in the trust game," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-14, July.
    4. De Marco Giuseppe & Immordino Giovanni, 2014. "Reciprocity in the Principal–Multiple Agent Model," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 445-482, January.
    5. Michał Krawczyk, 2013. "Delineating deception in experimental economics: Researchers' and subjects' views," Working Papers 2013-11, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    6. Peter Katuščák & Tomáš Miklánek, 2023. "What drives conditional cooperation in public good games?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 435-467, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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