Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance
We describe a plausible set of conditions under which the creation of a per-issue market for corporate cotes that is separate from the market for corporate shares can improve upon the way in which managerial adverse selection and moral hazard problems addresses via existing mechanisms for coroporate governance. Our results suggest that it may prove beneficial to reconsider the prohibitions against the operation of such markets as they currently exist in the US.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST-LOUIS, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND CENTER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, ST-LOUIS MISSOURI 63130 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/
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