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An Equilibrium Analysis of Divorce

Author

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  • Chiappori, P.A.
  • Weiss, Y.

Abstract

The paper provides a general equilibrium analysis in which individual decisions determine the aggregate divorce rate and are influenced by it. Reinforcement is caused by search frictions and a meeting technology whereby remarriage is more likely if the divorce rate is higher, implying multiple equilibria. Welfare tends to be higher at equilibria with more divorce. This result may be reversed if divorce reduces investments in marriage, e.g., children. The important insight that remains is that, in search markets, a legal policy that enforces voluntary contracts need not be socially optimal, because the presence of rents allows the partners to neglect the interest of prospective spouses whom they may meet in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiappori, P.A. & Weiss, Y., 2000. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Divorce," Papers 00-18, Tel Aviv.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:00-18
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    Cited by:

    1. Knowles, John, 2007. "Why Are Married Men Working So Much? Home Production, Household Bargaining and Per-Capita Hours," IZA Discussion Papers 2909, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. John Knowles, 2005. "Why are Married Men Working So Much?," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Terra G. Mckinnish, 2004. "Occupation, Sex-Integration, and Divorce," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 322-325, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    DIVORCE ; CHILDREN ; MARITAL STATUS;

    JEL classification:

    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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