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Incentives in Multi-period Regulation and Procurement:a Graphical Analysis


  • Dionne,G.
  • Fluet,C.


Cet article analyse les politiques de réglementation et d'achat public sur plusieurs périodes en présence d'asymétrie d'information entre le régulateur et les entreprises réglementées. Le cadre général de Laffont et Tirole est utilisé. Nous proposons une analyse graphique du modèle de second-rang en termes de la capacité d'engagement du régulateur. Comme dans Laffont et Tirole, nous distinguons les cas de plein engagement, d'engagement avec contrainte de renégociation et de non-engagement. Notre analyse graphique de l'environnement à deux périodes-deux types nous permet de mettre l'accent sur les fondements des principaux résultats concernant la nature des contrats incitatifs optimaux et de proposer des extensions à la contribution de Laffont et Tirole. Le modèle peut être appliqué à des secteurs où la production de biens publics (comme la sécurité dans le transport des matières dangereuses) est déléguée à des entreprises privées. This paper analyses multi-period regulation or procurement policies under asymmetricinformation-between the regulator and regulated firms within the general framework developed by Laffont and Tirole. We provide a graphical analysis of the second-best policy in terms of the regulator's commitment capacity. As in Laffont and Tirole, we distinguish between full commitment (long-term contracts that can be committed to), commitment and renegotiation (renegotiation-proof long-term contracts and noncommitment (a series of short-term contracts). Our graphical analysis of the two-period, two-type environment emphasizes the rationale of the main results concerning the form of the optimal incentive scheme and extends Laffont and Tirole's contribution. The analysis can be applied to situations where the production of a public good or service (such as the level of safety in the transport of hazardous materials) is delegated to private firms.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Dionne,G. & Fluet,C., 1995. "Incentives in Multi-period Regulation and Procurement:a Graphical Analysis," Papers 9516, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9516

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Amigues, Jean-Pierre & Favard, Pascal & Gaudet, Gerard & Moreaux, Michel, 1998. "On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute Is Limited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 153-170, May.
    2. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet, 2000. "original papers : Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 1-21.
    3. Touhami, A. & Martens, A., 1996. "Macroemesures in Computable General Equilibrium Models: a Probabilistic Treatment with an Application to Morocco," Cahiers de recherche 9621, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

    More about this item



    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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