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Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (Reprint 042)

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  • Franklin Allen
  • Stephen Morris
  • Andrew Postlewaite

Abstract

We present a finite period general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. We say that a rational expectations equilibrium exhibits an expected bubble if the price of an asset in one period is higher than any agent’s marginal valuation of holding the asset to maturity. We say the equilibrium exhibits a strong bubble if the price is higher than the dividend with probability one. We show that a necessary condition for an expected bubble to exist is that each agent must be short sale constrained at some period in the future with positive probability. We show that necessary conditions for a strong bubble to occur are that (1) each agent must have private information in the period and state in which the bubble occurs and (2) agents’ trades are not common knowledge. We also present examples of rational expectations equilibria that exhibit strict bubbles when the necessary conditions are satisfied.

Suggested Citation

  • Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite, "undated". "Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information (Reprint 042)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 16-92, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:pennfi:16-92
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    Cited by:

    1. Chari, V. V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2004. "Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 128-150, November.
    2. Amil Dasgupta & Andrea Prat, 2005. "Reputation and Asset Prices: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000368, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Chen, Joseph & Hong, Harrison & Stein, Jeremy C., 2001. "Forecasting crashes: trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 345-381, September.
    4. Earl A. Thompson & Jonathan Treussard & Charles R. Hickson, 2004. "Predicting Bubbles and Bubbles-Substitutes," UCLA Economics Working Papers 836, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. John Conlon, 2005. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles?," Game Theory and Information 0508007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000553, www.najecon.org.
    7. Harrison Hong & José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2006. "Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1073-1117, June.
    8. Michael R. Powers & David M. Schizer & Martin Shubik, 2003. "Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1413, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    9. Harrison Hong & Jose Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2005. "Advisors and Asset Prices: A Model of the Origins of Bubbles," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001003, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Yeongsuk Cho & Youngsik Kwak, 2018. "A Comparative Study on the Information Effect of Stock Lending and Borrowing and Short Selling between the Korea Stock Exchange and the New Stock Exchange," American Journal of Economics and Business Administration, Science Publications, vol. 10(1), pages 11-21, October.
    11. Dahai Yu, 1998. "Rational bubbles under diverse information," International Finance Discussion Papers 621, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Bubbles and Crises The Economic Journal," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Chen, Joseph & Hong, Harrison & Stein, Jeremy C., 2002. "Breadth of ownership and stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 171-205.
    14. Harrison Hong & Jose Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2005. "Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000861, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Simon van Norden & Huntley Schaller & ), 1995. "Speculative Behaviour, Regime-Switching, and Stock Market Crashes," Econometrics 9502003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Franklin Allen, 1996. "The Future of the Japanese Financial System," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-56, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    17. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2002. "Asset Price Bubbles and Stock Market Interlinkages," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-22, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 03-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.

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