Compensation and Top Management Turnover
An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by which their compensation is higher than expected. We also find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the dollar value of stock option compensation in relation to cash pay. The results, which are significant across the entire sample of CEOs, appear stronger for subsamples of CEO departures likely to have been voluntary.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (212) 998-0100
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:98-051. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.