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Sunk Costs and Competitiveness of European Banks After Deregulation

Author

Listed:
  • Cerasi, V.
  • Chizzolini, B.
  • Ivaldi, M.

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of the structure of the banking industry by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a sample of banks drawn from eight EEC countries over 1989-1993. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically both entry and the branching size of their network. The estimation then measures the branching costs and a upper bound for the entry costs. It also asseses how these costs evolve over time and to what extent they are influenced by various European directives, aiming at deregulating the banking industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Cerasi, V. & Chizzolini, B. & Ivaldi, M., 1997. "Sunk Costs and Competitiveness of European Banks After Deregulation," Papers 97.473, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Demyanyk, Yuliya, 2008. "U.S. banking deregulation and self-employment: A differential impact on those in need," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(1-2), pages 165-178.
    2. Cacciatore, Matteo & Ghironi, Fabio & Stebunovs, Viktors, 2015. "The domestic and international effects of interstate U.S. banking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 171-187.
    3. Carlo A. Favero & Francesco Giavazzi & Luca Flabbi, 1999. "The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in Europe: Evidence from Banks' Balance Sheets," NBER Working Papers 7231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gual, Jordi, 1999. "Deregulation, integration and market structure in European banking," IESE Research Papers D/397, IESE Business School.
    5. V. Cerasi & B. CHIZZOLINI & M. IVALDI, 1998. "Branching and Competitiveness across Regions in the Italian Banking Industry," Departmental Working Papers 1998-03, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    6. Calcagnini,G. & Bonis,R. de & Hester,D.D., 1999. "Determinants of bank branche expension in Italy," Working papers 32, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    7. Federico S. Mandelman, 2006. "Business cycles: a role for imperfect competition in the banking system," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    8. Gual, Jordi, 1999. "Deregulation, Integration and Market Structure in European Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 2288, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    BANKS ; REGULATION ; MONOPOLIES;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other

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